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The article analyzes the process of formation of national military units of the Red Army among 
the indigenous Muslims of the Steppe Region and Turkestan during the Civil War of 1918–
1922 on the basis of the following sources: legislative acts of the Soviet government, orders and 
reports of regional party authorities, and commanders of the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. In 
1918 and during the first half of 1919, the Bolsheviks didn’t achieve a considerable progress 
with regard to this question. The situation can be explained by a number of reasons. The 
positive dynamics of the process of forming national military units among the indigenous 
ethnic groups of the Steppe Region and Turkestan emerged in the first half of 1919 because 
of the success of the Red Army on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. Among other important 
factors in the successful mobilization of Muslims into the Red Army were: large-scale political 
work and propaganda campaign of the Communist party of Turkestan among the Muslims, 
the creation of a Muslim faction within the party, defection of the leaders of the Alash party 
and the Basmachi movement to the Bolsheviks, the formation of the Turkestan and Kirghiz 
(Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet socialist republics. Therefore, the Bolsheviks opted for the 
ethnic, rather than confessional principle in creating military units. This tactic logically 
followed the process of nation building in the region. It took account of the interests of ethnic 
groups convinced that the presence of military units was a symbol of the national identity and 
liability for retaining public and cultural independence. 
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В статье анализируется процесс формирования национальных воинских частей Крас-
ной Армии среди коренных мусульманских народов Степного края и Туркестана в пе-
риод Гражданской войны 1918–1922  гг. Источниками при подготовке статьи стали 
законодательные акты советского правительства, а  также приказы, рапорты, отчеты 
и  донесения региональных партийных органов власти и  командования Восточным 
и  Туркестанским фронтами. Выяснилось, что на начальном этапе войны  — весной 
1918 — в первой половине 1919 г. — большевикам не удалось добиться определенных 
успехов в  вопросе формирования национальных воинских частей Красной Армии 
из  числа коренных мусульманских народов Степного края и  Туркестана. Ситуация 
объясняется ликвидацией советского режима на большей части территории региона, 
недоверием коренного населения к советской власти и большевикам, сочувственным 
отношением казахов, узбеков и других народов к лидерам национальных движений, 
перешедших на сторону белой армии. Положительная динамика процесса формиро-
вания национальных воинских подразделений среди коренных этносов Степного края 
и Туркестана появилась в первой половине 1919 г. из-за успеха Красной Армии на Вос-
точном и Туркестанском фронтах. Не менее важным фактором успешной мобилиза-
ции мусульманского населения в ряды Красной Армии стали: широкомасштабная по-
литическая и пропагандистская работа Туркестанской коммунистической партии сре-
ди мусульманского населения, создание мусульманской фракции этой партии, переход 
на сторону большевиков лидеров партии Алаш и басмаческого движения, образование 
Туркестанской и  Киргизской (Казахской) автономных советских социалистических 
республик. В то же время большевики пошли по пути создания воинских частей на 
этнической, а не конфессиональной основе. Эта тактика была построена в логической 
последовательности процесса формирования нации в регионе. Она учитывала инте-
ресы этнических групп, убежденных в  том, что присутствие воинских частей, пред-
ставляющих их этническую группу, является символом национальной идентичности 
и обязательством сохранения государственной и культурной независимости.
Ключевые слова: Гражданская война, Красная Армия, Степной край, Туркестан, мусуль-
манские воинские части.
It is known that the practice of forming national military units emerged in Russia at 
the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. This trend was related to the socio-political situation 
in the country, which clearly demonstrated the crisis of the imperial national policy and 
the strengthening of the processes of ethnic mobilization of the peoples of Russia. After 
February 1917, the Provisional Government supported further nationalization of the 
military units of the Russian army1.
Muslim servicemen were also involved in these processes. Following the results of the 
First All-Russian Muslim Congress in Kazan (July 17–25, 1917), the All-Russian Muslim 
Military Shuro (Council) was formed and legalized by a special decree of the Kerensky 
1 Vestnik Vremennogo pravitelstva. 1917. 11, 17 oct. P. 34.
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government, and thus was able to have its commissioners in the Political Department of 
the Military Ministry, the General Directorate of the General Staff, headquarters of fronts 
and armies, in the headquarters of Muslim divisions and military districts2. According 
to T. N. Shevikova, active Muslimization took place in the Russian army at the end of 
September 1917. As a consequence, Muslim units comprised approximately 16 % of all 
nationalized infantry and rifle divisions and 20 % of cavalry units3.
The researchers emphasize that the Tatars and Bashkirs mainly sought to form mono-
ethnic Muslim military units within the Russian army, which indicated a higher stage of 
their ethnic integration. However, on the whole, the predominant tendencies of creating 
Muslim parts were based on ethnic, rather than on confessional principle. Representatives 
of various nationalities were often assembled in Muslim regiments, and their unification 
on the basis of a common religion was emphasized by the military leadership of the 
country as an important step towards creating “spiritually strong and disciplined military 
units”4.
A number of important decisions were made at the Turkestan Regional Congress 
of Muslim Warriors, which was held in Tashkent on 18 October, 1917 and was attended 
by 25 delegates. In particular, it was recognized as necessity that Muslim companies in 
the Turkestan Military Districtshould be created, mullahs should be appointed there with 
the same rights as regimental priests; premises for mosques in each garrison should be 
designated etc. However, the Muslim battalion created in November 1917 was comprised 
mainly of the Tatars and Bashkirs from different military units of the Turkestan Military 
District. 
The indigenous peoples of the Steppe Krai and Turkestan were exempted from military 
service even during the military reform in 1874. The long-standing discussion among the 
imperial military and civil officials on whether the Universal Military Service Act should 
apply to them had not been brought to an end by the beginning of World War I5. Thus, no 
Muslim division on a local ethnic basis had been formed either on the active fronts, or in 
the Steppe Krai and Turkestan before the October Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War.
The materials for the article were sourced from reports, orders, decrees and resolutions 
of the Turkestan regional Committee of the RCP(B), the Commissariat of the Turkestan 
front, the Muslim Bureau of the RCP(B), the Kyrgyz military Commissariat, the Kyrgyz 
revolutionary Committee and other military party structures responsible for the formation 
of national military units of the Turkestan and Kyrgyz ASSR. Most of these documents 
were published in a two-volume edition of “Inostrannaya voennaya interventsiya i 
Grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii i Kazahstane. [Foreign military intervention and 
Civil war in Central Asia and Kazakhstan]”6. Methodologically, the article is based on 
2 Iskhakov S. Rossiiskie musulmane i revolyutsiia (vesna 1917 — leto 1918 g.). Moscow, 2004. P. 333–
335.
3 Shevyakov T. N. “Natsionalizatsiia” russkoy armii v 1917  g. //  Vtoryie peterburgskie voenno-
istoricheskie chteniya molodyikh uchenykh. Iss. 2. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 37. 
4 Iskhakov S. Rossiiskie musulmane… P. 338.
5 Lyisenko Yu. A. Vopros o voinskoy povinnosti dlia kazahskogo naseleniia (70 gg. XIX — nachalo ХХ 
v.) // Izvestiia Altayskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. 2012. N 4/2. P. 186–194.
6 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia i Grazhdanskaia voina v Srednei Azii i Kazahstane. Dokumentyi 
i materialyi. Vol. 1. Alma-Ata. 1963; Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia i Grazhdanskaia voina v Srednei 
Azii i Kazahstane. Dokumentyi i materialyi. Vol. 2. Alma-Ata. 1964. 
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the principle of historicism, aimed at an objective analysis of historical sources and their 
objective interpretation.
The events of the Civil War in Russia in 1918–1920 were studied in detail in the works 
by Soviet scholars7. They presented in one way or another the stories of civil opposition on 
the national outskirts of the Kyrgyz and Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: 
progress in the war on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts, the guerrilla and Basmachi 
movement, party work and propaganda campaign of the Bolsheviks in the region, their 
economic policy8. The establishment of the Red army and national military units was 
analyzed within the framework of the theory of class struggle, and therefore it could give 
a an objective assessment of those events.
In fact, modern studies on the history of the Civil War in Russia in 1918–1920, have 
not focused on the regional aspect. This article is an attempt to fill out the existing gap.
In the first months of the Soviet power the Bolshevik leadership supported the policy 
of forming national units, including Muslim ones. On November 15, 1917, Stalin signed the 
Decree of the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities (Narkomnats), which allowed “free 
grouping of soldiers on a national basis within a military unit”9. However, the process of 
creating Muslim units was carried out spontaneously and at a very slow pace. S. Iskhakov 
supposes that the reasons for this were the Tatar-Bashkir contradictions, the personnel 
problems and the refusal of the Muslim officers of the former tsarist army to participate 
in this process. Against the backdrop of political chaos during the first months of the 
Soviet power, the All-Russian Muslim Military Shuro tried to concentrate in its hands the 
top command over all newly created Muslim military units. Its members declared their 
support for the socialist government on a federative basis as well as readiness to put into 
effect all its decrees10.
The Bolsheviks perceived the fact that the Shuro presented itself as the leader in the 
process of building Muslim army units as a threat to their political influence on the country 
many-million-strong Muslim population. Therefore, on January 17, 1918, an alternative 
Central Commissariat for Muslims of Russia headed by M. Vakhitov was created under the 
People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. The activity of the All-Russian Muslim military 
Shuro was recognized as counter-revolutionary, and the structure was dissolved.
One of the central tasks of the Central Commissariat for Muslims of Russia was the 
formation of Muslim military units in The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. A Military 
Department was established within the Commissariat with the view to developing the 
principles of forming and operating of Muslim units. Its role significantly increased after 
the outbreak of the Civil War and the signing of Stalin’s Decree of the People’s Commissariat 
for the Establishment of the Muslim Workers’ and Peasants’ Army on May 2, 1918. It was 
planned to integrate its military units into the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) 
and used in military operations.
7 Polyakov Yu. A. Oktyabr’ i grazhdanskaia voina. Moscow, 1966; Svetacheva M. I. Imperialisticheskaia 
interventsiia v Sibiri i na Dal’nem Vostoke (1918–1919). Novosibirsk, 1983.
8 Grigor’ev V. K. Razgrom melkoburzhuaznoi kontrrevolyutsii v Kazahstane. Alma-Ata, 1984; Ze-
velev A. I., Polyakov Yu. A., Chugunov A. I. Basmachestvo: vozniknovenie, sushchnost’, krah. Moscow, 1981; 
Inoiatov H. Sh. Narody Srednei Azii v bor’be protiv interventov i vnutrennei kontrrevolyutsii. Moscow, 1984; 
Pokrovskii  S. N. Razgrom inostrannyh voennykh interventov i vnutrennei kontrrevolyutsii v Kazahstane 
(1918–1920). Alma-Ata, 1967.
9 Iskhakov S. Rossiyskie musulmane… P. 431.
10 Ibid. P. 439.
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In connection with the abovementioned Decree of the People’s Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs the process of creating military formations from the indigenous population 
of the Steppe region and Turkestan began in May 1918. At the same time, it is important to 
emphasize that the Central Commissariat for Muslims of internal Russia did not extend its 
authority to the Central Asian region of the country. The Council of People’s Commissars 
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian: Sovnarkom; SNK RSFSR) 
issued a decree about the establishment of the Kyrgyz (Kazakh) department under the 
People’s Commissariat in May 12, 1918. Broad competence related to the solution of 
socio-economic, administrative, cultural, educational, ethnic and interethnic problems 
was delegated to it.
The mobilization of the Kazakh population into the Red Army was entrusted to 
the Military sub-department of the Kirghiz (Kazakh) department under the People’s 
Commissariat of the RSFSR. In addition to fulfilling the main function — the formation 
of military units, the Branch coordinated the work of local councils, dealt with issues of 
tax policy, food supply of the population, preparation for the convocation of the Congress 
of Soviets, and organization of the regional management body. On November 9, 1918, 
the chairman of the Department informed the central authorities that the Division had 
begun extensive agitation among the Kazakhs “to rally them in the struggle for Soviet 
power”11. In Turkestan, the first steps towards the military mobilization of the indigenous 
population were made at the end of June 1918, when the People’s Commissar for Military 
Affairs of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TurkASSR) issued an 
order to establish the 1st Tashkent Muslim Battalion12. In general, as it was noted by the 
party’s regional bodies, the process of mobilizing the Muslim population of the Steppe 
Krai and Turkestan was extremely slow.
What seems clear is that there were several reasons for this situation. Firstly, by the 
summer of 1918, Soviet power had been liquidated on most of the territory of the Urals, 
Turgai, Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions. The fighting in the Eastern, Semirechye and 
Trans-Caspian fronts in the autumn of 1918 resulted in the territories of the Steppe Krai 
and TurkASSR being cut off from the European part of the country and the political center 
of the Bolsheviks — Petrograd. In fact, the region found itself in a blockade by the White 
Guard and was deprived of material, technical and financial assistance. The “Askhabad 
probka” (the blockade) and the simultaneous fall of Soviet Baku deprived Turkestan of 
the opportunity to receive oil, which caused a decline in traffic all along the Orenburg-
Tashkent railway. 
Secondly, the reason for a low level of participation of the indigenous population in the 
process of building Muslim units of the Red Army was the extremely unpopular Bolshevik 
power. It is commonly known that the development of the ethno-political situation on 
the Central Asian outskirts of Russia at the turn of 1917–1918  led to the creation of 
national-territorial autonomy of Alash and Kokand autonomy in the region, which acted 
as alternative to the Soviet power. In the face of a threat of the collapse of the state, the 
Bolsheviks refused to recognize the legitimacy of their formation. This led to the military 
defeat of the Red Army of the Kokand Autonomy in February 1918 and the proclamation 
of the TurkASSR in April of the same year. In accordance with the “Regulations on the 
Turkestan Soviet Republic”, it was created as a state entity based exclusively on class 
11 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia…Vol. 1. P. 154.
12 Ibid. P. 48.
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principles, with power functions at all levels of the management system belonging to the 
Soviets. This ruled out the possibility of interpreting its political structure as a national-
territorial autonomy, which, combined with the actual exclusion of the councils of Muslim 
and dekhkan deputies from exercise of power, made the Bolshevik authorities extremely 
unpopular with the indigenous Muslim population.
The Kazakh nationals and the Alash government defect to the side of the “white 
movement”, actively cooperating with the armed forces of Kolchak and Denikin. The 
Kazakh population was sympathetic to the leaders of the national Alash movement, taking 
active part in the creation of the Alash armed groups.
Thirdly, the reasons for the distrust of the indigenous population of the Steppe Krai 
and Turkestan to the Soviet government and the Bolsheviks, its passive participation in 
the mobilization into the Red Army could be explained by the so-called “Armenian issue”. 
With limited forces in the early 1918, the Bolsheviks attracted members of the regional 
branch of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party to defeat the Kokand Autonomy, having 
armed them and created combat units of the Red Army13. The crushing defeat of autonomy 
was accompanied by massacres of the indigenous Muslim population, atrocities, robbery 
and violence committed by Armenians. The military cooperation between the Bolsheviks 
and the “Dashnaktsutyun” continued until the spring 1919. From 1918 until mid — 1919, 
the revolutionary dictatorship and the Soviets in Andijan were in fact controlled by the 
Dashnaks. Under the pretext of combating the basmachi, they carried out raids on the 
villages of the Muslim population and the cities of the region for the purpose of requisition 
or robbery14.
Given the situation, throughout the year of 1918, the regional Bolshevik authorities 
excluded the possibility of mass mobilization of the indigenous Muslim population into 
the Red Army. Resolution VI of the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the Republic of 
Turkestan, held on October 6, 1918, recognized the “mpossibility of declaring mobilization” 
among the Muslim population. The only thing that was suggested was “intensification 
of agitation for the defense of the Socialist Motherland among the broad masses of the 
Muslim proletariat”15.
The situation began to change only by the early 1919, after several successful 
military operations of the Red Army on the Eastern Front. On July 10, 1919, the Kazakh 
Revolutionary Committee (Kazrevkom) with the center in Orenburg was established to 
exercise supreme military and civil power in the territory of the Urals, Turgai, Akmola and 
Semipalatinsk regions. With the organization of Kazrevkom, the Kyrgyz department under 
the Narkomnatz was abolished, and the management departments and subdepartments 
were created. Under Art. 6 of the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the 
RSFSR “On the Revolutionary Committee for the Management of the Kyrgyz Krai” the 
issues of mobilization into the Red Army, of the Kazakh population, were delegated to 
the competence of the Kirghiz Military Commissariat16. Regional and county military 
commissariats were established in the lower administrative-territorial units of the region.
13 Akbieva Z. Rol’ musulmanskogo Byuro RKP(b) v dele zaschityi interesov mestnogo naseleniia 
Turkestanskogo kraia // Karadeniz. 2015. N 27. P. 57–73.
14 Buttino M. Revolyutsiia naoborot. Srednyaia Aziya mezhdu padeniem tsarskoy imperii i 
obrazovaniem SSSR. Moscow, 2007. P. 281.
15 Inostrannaia voennaia… Vol. 1. P. 75–78.
16 Sobranie uzakoneniy i rasporyazheniy pravitelstva za 1919  g. Upravlenie delami Sovnarkoma 
SSSR. Moscow, 1943. P. 533–536.
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With the active participation of the Kirghiz Military Commissariat, the formation 
of the Kyrgyz exemplary cavalry regiment comprised of the Kazakhs of the Bukeyev 
Steppe with more than 1,700 people was completed by the summer of 191917. On July 
24, 1919, Commander of the Eastern Front M. Frunze signed an order under which the 
Astrakhan (Southern) group of the Eastern Front was formed. It included all the troops 
of the region, with the Kazakh horse formations of the Bukeyev steppe. Together with the 
Kyrgyz Mounted Brigade of the Fourth Army formed in Saratov they formed the Kirghiz 
Equestrian Division18.
The success of the Red Army on the Eastern Front gave rise to the process of creating 
Kazakh armed units in the Turgai region. By February 1, 1919, under the leadership of 
the military commissar of the Turgai district, A. Imanov, the First Turgai Revolutionary 
Regiment consisting of 175 members was formed, which as a separate combat unit joined 
the 3rd Brigade of the Orenburg Division. During 1919, it was proposed that two cavalry 
squadrons, a training team, a machine gun crew and an artillery battery were created in 
Turgai Uyezd19. However, Imanov failed to implement the plans. The offensive of Kolchak 
troops on the Eastern Front, which began in April 1919, the fighting units of the Alash-
Orda organization. They raised a rebellion in Turgai and arrested, and later shot A. Imanov 
together with 18 of his Kazakh associates who supported the Bolsheviks. 
During the spring of 1919, after the liberation of Orenburg and Uralsk from the 
formations of the White Guard, the process of creating Kazakh military units in the Urals 
region was speeded up. At the end of February 1919, the regional congress of Soviets was 
held in Uralsk, where it was decided to set up a special department for Kyrgyz affairs 
under the regional revolutionary committee. The head of the department, B. Karataev, 
was entrusted with carrying out mass political work and propaganda among the Kazakh 
population, and mobilizing into the Red Army units20.
In April 1919, A. Dzhangildin was mandated by M. Frunze, the chairman of the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, to provide 
overall leadership “over the speedy formation of military Kazakh units in the areas of the 
Urals, Turgai and Transcaspian, and also the Bukeyev Horde”. From September 1919 to 
January 1920, A. Dzhangildin succeeded in creating cavalry detachments comprising up 
to 700 horsemen21.
In the autumn of 1919, the formation of Kazakh combat units was significantly 
accelerated. In October 1919, the recruitment of five separate Kazakh squadrons began. 
They were deployed at The Kyrgyz Military Commissariat of Orenburg22. In the second 
half of 1919, in Omsk, the 1st Siberian Kazakh Volunteer Cavalry Regiment was formed 
from the youth of Akmola and Semipalatinsk provinces. In 1920, it was transferred to 
Biysk, Altai Province, where it remained until 1922.
It should be noted that at the expense of incredible efforts the Muslim Bureau managed 
to resolve the issue of the participation of Armenian armed formations within the Red 
Army. The problem was first identified at the 7th Extraordinary Congress of Turkestan 
17 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia…P. 223–225.
18 Ibid. P. 258.
19 Ibid. P. 287–290.
20 Ibid. P. 196–197.
21 Ibid. P. 299.
22 Prikaz Kirgizskogo kraevogo komissariata po voennyim delam o formirovanii kazahskih 
kavaleriyskikh chastey // CSA RK. F. 59. Op. 2. D. 19. L. 8.
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Soviets in March 1919 by Muslim delegates, who proposed a resolution “to disarm and 
disband the Dashnaktsutyun detachment and to purge the Red Guard of the criminal 
element”. The resolution was not adopted, but the position of the communist Muslims of 
Turkestan was clearly formulated, and already on May 26, 1919, the commission of the 
Turkestan Central Executive Committee (TurkCEC) ordered the Armenian community 
of Fergana to surrender their weapons, and parts of the Red Army in the province were 
to discharge Armenian soldiers. In a few days it was announced that the disarmament 
was completed in Andijan, Kokand and Skobelev, where the Armenian Dashnak fighting 
squads were mainly concentrated. The next blow to the Dashnaktsutyun was dealt by the 
decision to wind up its branches in Turkestan under the pressure of Muslim Communists 
supported by both the Russian Communists of Turkestan and Moscow. It must be noted 
that the Chairman of the Musbureau, T. Ryskulov, used the talks with one of the leaders of 
the Madamin-bey Basmachi movement for demoralization and intimidation. It resulted 
in the latter taking the side of the Soviet government. All these events objectively led to 
the growing popularity of the Red Army among the indigenous Muslim population of the 
region.
An enormous amount of propaganda in this regard was carried out by the 
Revolutionary Military Council (Revvoensovet) of the Turkestan Front. In fact, it issued 
monthly orders to strengthen ideological and combat work in the army, published leaflets 
and posters, held “rallies resorting to a wide range of all available campaign forces and 
means”, organized parades of troops “mainly in the regions, indigenous areas, involving 
all those recruited Muslims”23. 
By the decision of the VII Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Turkestan (March 
7–31, 1919), the Muslim Section was established within the Political Department of the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Republic. Its main task was to conduct 
political work and propaganda among the indigenous population of the region. Under 
its leadership there were organized “the weeks of the Muslim soldiers of the Red Army”, 
series of lectures in regions and districts of the Republic. The Muslim Section also 
made great efforts to launch the agitation train "Red Turkestan" and to create theatre and 
literary-publishing clubs24.
It should be stressed that during the process of mobilization of the indigenous 
population of the Kirghiz (Kazakh) and Turkestan republics into the Red Army, the 
Bolsheviks chose to form military units on an ethnic rather than confessional basis. This 
tactic logically followed the process of nation building in the region implemented by the 
central Bolshevik leadership. Keeping the very space and name “Turkestan” in the system 
of national Soviet autonomies, as well as the concept of “Muslims of Turkestan” provided 
a basis for the reproduction of the local version of pan-Turkism and the idea of “Greater 
Turkestan”, which was extremely undesirable for the Bolsheviks.
In general, the idea of creating a republic of the Turkic peoples of Russia had supporters 
in all national branches of the RCP(b) of the Turkic-Muslim regions. It was a component 
of the prevalent ideas among the Turkic-speaking communists about the priority of the 
tasks of the national revolution over the socialist one. This situation remained a matter 
of concern for the leadership of the RCP(b), especially with the growth of structure in 
the Basmachi movement under the Pan-Turkist slogans. Since autumn 1920  Bukhara 
23 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia… Vol. 2. P. 443.
24 Ibid. P. 447.
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had become the main center of the Basmachi movement led by prominent supporters 
of the pan-Turkic project, the former head of the revolutionary committee of Bashkiria 
A. Z. Validov and the Minister of War of the former Young Turk government, Enver Pasha. 
Young Bukharans, who came to power in the Bukhara People’s Soviet Republic, began to 
demonstrate Turkic orientation in their policy: the system of records management was 
switched from Farsi (Tajik) to Turkic, the study of which was encouraged in every possible 
way. A new center lobbying pan-Turkism emerged in Bukhara25.
Therefore, as a counter measure to communist pan-Turkism in 1920, it was 
decided to divide the TurkASSR into three national parts  — “Uzbekistan, Kirghizia 
and Turkmenistan”. Ethnic based separation of the TurkASSR, Bukhara and Khiva was 
perceived by the Bolsheviks as a way of weakening Pan-Turkist sentiments and splitting 
the local elite on ethnic grounds. The formation of the military units of the Red Army 
on an ethnic basis was thus seen as another barrier to the Turkic-Muslim integration of 
Turkestan peoples26.
This theory is backed up by the data on the formation of the Red Army among the 
indigenous population during 1919–1920 carried out exclusively on an ethnic basis27. In 
the spring of 1919–1920  the Kyrgyz military registration and enlistment office formed 
37 military units and subunits from the Kazakh population only in the territory of three 
regions  — Bukeevskaya, Ural, Turgai. On November 18, 1919, Revolutionary Military 
Council of the Semirechensk Front formed the 3d Red Cavalry Eastern Regiment. The 
city of Kapal was chosen as the place of its deployment28. On February 5, 1920, a separate 
Kazakh horse brigade was manned from the Kazakhs of the Semirechenskaya region by 
the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front. The formation 
center was the city Verny29. The creation of a Muslim volunteer squadron from the Uzbeks 
began in the Ferghana region on July 3, 1919. The formation of the Karakirgizian special 
horse cavalry went on throughout the year of 1919. A separate Turkestan Dungan cavalry 
regiment was formed under the leadership of Masanchi in September 24, 1920, and a 
separate Uighur cavalry division — under the command of A. Rozybakiev in early 192130.
Of particular importance was the fact that the mobilization into the Red Army 
involved dekhkans — participants of the Basmachi movement. For example, the Kyrgyz 
Red Cavalry Brigade was established in the Fergana region in the summer of 1920 and 
comprised 400 people, including former members of Madaminbek’s basmachi formations. 
A considerable part of them, led by one of the field commanders, Dzhanybek, took the 
side of the Soviet government and joined the Red Army. The latter was appointed assistant 
to the commander of the Kirghiz Cavalry Red Regiment31.
25 Abashin S. Natsionalizmy v Sredney Azii. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 184–185.
26 Lyisenko Yu. A., Anisimova I. V., Barmin V. A., Tarasova E. V., Bochkareva I. B. Etnopoliticheskie 
protsessy v tsentralnoaziatskih okrainah Rossii v period revolyutsiy 1917 g. Barnaul, 2017. P. 299–301.
27 Pashin V. P. On the Sources of Establishment-selective Work of the Bolshevik Party // Bylye Gody. 
2014. Vol. 31, iss. 1. P. 88.
28 Prikaz Revvoensoveta Semirechenskogo fronta o sformirovanii Kazahskogo kavaleriyskogo polka 
// CSA RK. F. 180. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 222. (Central’nyj gosudarstvennyj arhiv respubliki Kazahstan )
29 Iz prikaza Revvoensoveta Turkestanskogo fronta o formirovanii otdelnoy Kazahskoy konnoy 
brigadyi // CSA RK. F. 109. Op. 1. D. 15. L. 55.
30 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia i Grazhdanskaia voina v Srednei Azii i Kazahstane. Dokumentyi 
i materialyi. Vol. 2. P. 296.
31 Ibid. P. 371.
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Some progress made by the Bolsheviks in the creation of Muslim military units 
enabled the commander of the Turkestan Front, M. V. Frunze to announce for the first 
time that “the workers of the local national population aged between 19 and 35” were 
subject to conscription to the Red Army by the order of May 11, 1920. It was carried out 
under the Decree of the Council of Labor and Defense “On calling up the Citizens of the 
Non-Russian Nationality from Siberia, Turkestan and Other Outskirts for Military Service 
in the Red Army” issued on May 10, 192032. The mobilization of the Muslim population 
in Tashkent was to begin on June 25, 1920, and in the regions of the province — on July 
10, 1920. Due to the difficult military situation, the recruitment in the Semirechenskaya 
region and Bukhara republic was temporarily postponed. The recruitment was successful, 
giving a replenishment of about 25 thousand people in the whole Turkestan33.
However, it should be noted that the Muslim Bureau (Musbyuro), the Kirov military 
commissariat (Kirvoenkomat) and other party structures responsible for the formation 
of national military units in the Turkestan and Kirghiz ASSR faced a whole range of 
problems. The main one was the language barrier and ignorance of the Russian language 
among the majority of Muslims who joined the Red Army.
At the meetings of the residents in most villages (auls) of the Kyrgyz Autonomous 
Republic, which took place during the spring-summer of 1920, there was expressed 
willingness to send recruits and pre-recruits to serve in the Red Army. However, it was 
requested that “mobilized officers and teachers” should be assigned to “the recruits from 
the Kyrgyz population, because our Kyrghyzs are completely wild people and do not speak 
Russian”34. 
The problem of insufficient funding of both the process of mobilization process and 
the created military units was also a challenge. Thus, A. Dzhangildin in the report to the 
commander of the Turkestan front, M. Frunze, stressed that during the mobilization of the 
Kazakhs of the Turgai region he had to face the lack of uniforms and weapons. “I had to 
refuse, though, unwillingly, many people”, A. Dzhangildin noted, “promising to bring that 
information to the attention of the higher command. The formed military units on their 
horses, in Kyrgyz common clothes and providing for themselves, were armed with what 
they got mainly from the whites, and with various weapons, including the Berdan rifles”35.
The problem of supply of commanders for national forces was also serious. The 
training of junior commanders was conducted in the regiments. As a matter of urgency, 
numerous military courses sprung up in the cities of the Kyrgyz Republic and Turkestan 
ASSR, propaganda of military knowledge among the population was promoted through the 
creation of various schools, clubs and societies, and the development of military-technical 
sports. By the end of 1920, as a result of the enormous work, there were infantry, artillery, 
cavalry, military topography and other courses successfully working in the region, where 
command and office staff were prepared for the national units of the Red Army.
32 Bezugolnyi A. Yu. Prizyivnoe zakonodatelstvo i komplektovanie raboche-krestyanskoy Krasnoy 
armii predstavitelyami nerusskih natsionalnostey v 1920-e gg. // Vestnik of Kalmyk Institute for Humanities 
research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2013. N 3. P. 103.
33 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia… Vol. 2. P. 373.
34 Postanovlenie obschego sobraniya zhiteley 1,2 i 3 aulov Dzhansarinskoy volosti Petropavlovskogo 
uezda o gotovnosti doprizyivnikov sluzhit v ryadah Krasnoy armii 22 iyulya 1920 g. // CSA RK. F. 1346. 
Op. 1. D. 2. L. 13–14.
35 Inostrannaia voennaia interventsiia… Vol. 2. P. 211.
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It should be noted that after the end of the Civil War in the USSR, the creation of 
national units within the Red Army was developed on a “voluntary and equal basis”. This 
principle was embodied in the decisions of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b), held in April 
17–25, 1923. The main ideologue of the program of national construction in the Red 
Army in the mid-1920s was M. V. Frunze, who believed that the numerous non-Russian 
contingents were “a source of additional power” for the Red Army36. At the same time, the 
Law “On Compulsory Military Service” of citizens of the Soviet state adopted on September 
18, 1925, did not presuppose a mass military service call-up in the national republics and 
regions. In Article 16 of the Law a special procedure for compulsory military service by 
agreement with the national CEC was provided for a number of peoples, the list of which 
was not permanent. Therefore, according to A. Y. Bezugolnyi, the impact of mobilization 
on the population of national regions in the first half of the 1920s was not great and did 
not exceed 0.1–0.2 % of the total population. The total number of inhabitants of the Soviet 
republics where the national parts were formed (excluding Ukraine and Belarus) was 
estimated at 25,851 people37. Thus, until the late 1920s, a significant part of the peoples 
of the USSR, including the Kazakh SSR and the Soviet republics of Central Asia, was not 
covered by general military conscription.
* * *
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the Civil War in Russia, which started in the 
spring of 1918, and the threat of the collapse of the country caused the Bolshevik leadership 
to take urgent measures aimed at enlisting the representatives of national minorities into 
the Red Army. In the first months of the war, in the conditions of distrust of the indigenous 
population towards the Soviet government and its liquidation in most parts of the Steppe 
Krai and Turkestan, the Bolsheviks didn’t achieve any success with regard to that question. 
The positive dynamics of the process began in early 1919, thanks to the success of the 
Red Army on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. The beginning of cooperation between 
the Central Asian ethnic elites and the leaders of the Basmachi movement with the Soviet 
power contributed to the growth of confidence in the Soviet regime on the part of the 
indigenous population. One of the important factors in the successful mobilization of the 
Muslim population of the Central Asian region into the Red Army was the large-scale 
political-propaganda carried out among them by the Muslim Bureau of the Communist 
Party of Turkestan, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front and the 
Kazakh Revolutionary Committee (Kazrevkom). At the same time, the Bolsheviks opted 
for creating military units on an ethnic rather than confessional basis. This tactic logically 
followed the process of nation building in the region, which suppressed attempts to 
integrate the indigenous peoples on the basis of their common kinship — Turkism. In the 
Bolsheviks’ view, the formation of military units on an ethnic basis was the key to shaping 
national identity and a stage in the forthcoming national-territorial division of Central 
Asia within the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination.
36 Bezugolnyi A. Yu. Prizyivnoe zakonodatelstvo… P. 107.
37 Ibid. P. 107.
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